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Abstract
This study focuses on the political attitudes of UK citizens in the aftermath of the ‘Brexit’ vote. 
It has been argued that differences within electorates across Europe are found in disputes over 
taxes, redistribution of wealth and social welfare, as much as in divergent ideas on how to deal 
with globalisation, migration, and climate change. This article uses the 2016–2017 round of 
the European Social Survey (N = 1959) to shed light on two important issues in regard to the 
relationship between ‘old’ and ‘new’ politics. By using multiple correspondence analysis, we first 
consider the structure, or dimensionality, of the space of political attitudes in contemporary UK 
society. Contrary to a prevailing discourse that forwards the argument that postmaterial values 
constitute an altogether separate political dimension in late modernity, we observe that such 
values collapse into traditional left/right standpoints. Second, we discuss the connection between 
class (economic capital, cultural capital, and occupational class) and position-takings in the space 
of political attitudes. We show that class retains a limited effect on political position-takings, 
where educational capital plays the most important role. The divisions between the politically 
interested–uninterested, old–young, men–women, and rural–urban are more clearly demarcated 
than differences between people of different social class positions. Furthermore, polarisation 
is most prevalent between a highly opinionated, relatively resourceful, small minority of the 
population.
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Introduction
This article analyses political attitudes after the UK referendum on whether the UK 
should leave or stay within the European Union, held in June 2016. The final votes 
recorded were 17,410,742 (51.9%) to leave, versus 16,141,241 (48.1%) to remain (The 
Electoral Commission). The campaign leading up to and the pursuing polarising rhetoric 
in the aftermath of the referendum may be viewed as the epitome of the ‘postmaterial’ 
turn in contemporary Western politics, where issues on (national) identity, immigration, 
climate change, and lifestyle take centre stage.
The focus of this article is not on the outcomes and/or negotiations of Brexit, rather, 
its focus is on the dividing lines in the political attitudes of the UK citizenry in the after-
math of the ‘Brexit’ referendum. Indeed, it has been argued for some time that differ-
ences within electorates across Europe are found as much in disputes over taxes, 
redistribution of wealth, and social welfare, as in divergent ideas on how to deal with 
globalisation, migration, and climate change. While clashes in the political landscape are 
still found at the left–right divide, in late modernity we have also witnessed battles of a 
new kind. These have been termed postmaterial (Habermas, 1981; Inglehart, 1977), 
authoritarian-libertarian (Flanagan and Lee 2003; Kitschelt, 1994), and GAL-TAN 
(Green, Alternative, Libertarian versus Traditional, Authoritarian and Nationalist) 
(Hooghe et al., 2002).
To promote a deeper understanding of the UK political landscape after the Brexit vote 
and to understand the relation between ‘old’ and ‘new’ politics, we study the make-up of 
the space of political attitudes, as manifested in the aftermath of the ‘Brexit’ referendum, 
and how different segments of the electorate oriented in this space. We draw on the 
2016–2017 European Social Survey (ESS), which provides a representative sample of 
the British population (N = 1959) to answer two research questions that relate to key 
debates in contemporary sociology. First, we ask: What is the dimensionality of the space 
of political attitudes? We explore this via an exploratory, Bourdieu-inspired analysis. 
Second, we ask: What is the class related nature of political dividing lines in UK society? 
Indeed, the question regarding class and political behaviour is a contested one. Our 
approach allows us to study how people with different occupations, educational levels, 
and incomes, along with other demographics, orient themselves in the space of political 
attitudes.
Although some qualitative research has been conducted on the political landscape in 
the era of Brexit using a Bourdieusian analysis (e.g. Mckenzie, 2017), little by way of 
quantitative research drawing on a Bourdieusian framework has been done. We seek to 
contribute by capturing key attitudes of a representative sample of the British population 
in the period of Brexit negotiations.
New politics and class
We refer to the ‘new politics’ here as the GAL-TAN dimension (Bakker et al., 2015; 
Hooghe et al., 2002), which is an expression of the social values and attitudes rooted in 
the notion of postmaterial politics, referring to issues outside of, strictly speaking, eco-
nomic concerns, for example, wages and material wealth. GAL-TAN refers to a politics 
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more broadly conceived than those pertaining to economic issues, it is concerned with 
what Giddens (1994) refers to as ‘life politics’. This includes attitudes oriented towards 
conserving what are perceived to be traditional values around, for instance, the nuclear 
family, control on immigration and the preservation/protection of national sovereignty. 
In the era of Brexit, the UK makes for an interesting case to explore how the left–right 
and GAL-TAN dimensions relate to each other, especially when there have been new 
populist mobilisations; key examples include the campaign group, Momentum on the 
political left, affiliated to the Labour Party, and the Brexit Party, on the political right.
While social class has played an important and contentious role in terms of the forma-
tion of political attitudes (Lipset, 1960), it has been argued that it stops short at explain-
ing how the people in advanced industrial societies manoeuvre in the social world in late 
modernity (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Inglehart, 1997). Others, however, have 
empirically shown that class continues to shape people’s political orientations (Evans 
and Tilley, 2017; Stubager, 2008, 2009). The educational and occupational advantages 
among liberal individuals, compared with the generally less educated and more precari-
ous authoritarianists, suggest not only that we are face-to-face with severe cleavages in 
society. They also suggest that class, as measured with educational and income levels as 
well as occupation, remains an important basis from which people form political atti-
tudes (ibid). Besides the observed importance of occupation and educational levels 
(Evans and Tilley, 2017), researchers in the Bourdieusian tradition have shown that class, 
both in terms of capital volume and composition, connects to political attitudes (Flemmen 
and Haakestad, 2018; Harrits, 2013).
Notwithstanding the contested notions of the explanatory power of class, there is still 
ambiguity regarding how ‘new’ political attitudes relate to the traditional left-right atti-
tudes. Some have argued that the GAL-TAN dimension should be understood as alto-
gether separate from the left–right scale (Hooghe et al., 2002; Surridge, 2018). Others 
contend that the old and the new political disputes conflate – for instance, by observing 
that attitudes towards immigration and transnational governance are embedded in the 
left–right conflict (Evans and Tilley, 2017). Ultimately, this is an empirical question 
regarding the dimensionality of what we, following Harrits et al. (2010), refer to as the 
space of political attitudes. Following a similar line of reasoning and concerns Wheatly 
et al. (2014) have illustrated the merits of exploratory statistical methods when attempt-
ing to map the contemporary terrain of political attitudes. Do values connected to the 
‘old’ and ‘new’ politics belong in altogether separate attitudinal constellations? How do 
people with different class positions relate to these set of attitudes?
In relation to these questions the Bourdieusian framework has two, interrelated, mer-
its. First, it forwards a theory on how class – understood as an internalised and pre-
reflexive set of dispositions formed by conditions of existence (access to resources and 
socialisation in various fields) – produces tastes and opinions that connect to particular 
classes of people (Bourdieu, 1984). Bourdieu famously put his theory to use in 
Distinction (1984), where a vast amount of lifestyle attributes were mapped onto a 
‘social space’ describing peoples’ various forms of capital, and also, in additional analy-
ses, where such social resources were traced on spaces mapping lifestyle constellations. 
While primarily concerned with cultural consumption, Bourdieu argued that both the 
strength and contents of one’s political opinions can be traced back to one’s class. The 
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‘ability to produce an opinion’ is connected to volume of capital (ibid; Enelo, 2012). 
One may thus expect more affluent segments of the population to be overall more opin-
ionated on policy statements than people lacking capital. As for the contents of one’s 
opinion the prominence of so-called GAL-orientations among more well-off segments 
of the population may be viewed as the extension of their ‘distance from necessity’ 
(Bourdieu, 1984) and cosmopolitan tastes and lifestyles (Prieur and Savage, 2011). 
Conversely, perceived threats of globalisation and immigration may reflect a ‘taste for 
the necessary’ commonly found in less well-off factions of society – the so-called ‘los-
ers of globalisation’ (Hobolt, 2016: 1265). Furthermore, underprivileged groups may be 
attracted to populist right-wing, nostalgia, and anti-establishment values and policy 
because they envision a distance from a ‘corrupt or incompetent political elite’ (Gidron 
and Hall, 2017: 59). Their support for anti-immigration and anti-EU policy may be 
understood as a strategy to take back their lost or repressed social status in post-indus-
trial and globalised modernity (ibid).
Second, the Bourdieusian framework provides the methodological tools to study the 
relation between values, opinions, tastes, and so on, and class in an exploratory and rela-
tional manner via multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). A Bourdieusian approach 
provides a powerful yet under-utilised framework when it comes to studying the com-
plex political landscape and the class-related attitudinal differences in UK society. Harrits 
(2013) has argued that ‘empirical analyses of class relations and political practices in a 
Bourdieusian perspective are almost non-existent’ (p. 173). Bourdieu-inspired sociolo-
gists have mostly been occupied with the realm of culture and consumption, not politics. 
Thanks to the upsurge of MCA in sociology over the recent years, as noted by Savage 
and Silva (2013), this trend has, however, started to retract. Enelo (2012), Harrits et al. 
(2010), Harrits (2013), Flemmen (2014), and Flemmen and Haakestad (2018) have illus-
trated the importance of both economic and cultural capital in the Danish, Norwegian, 
and Swedish political spaces, respectively. These studies found that the left–right and 
postmaterial values constitute two separate attitudinal dimensions in Scandinavia. 
Volume of capital relates to liberal/anti-liberal views, whereas capital composition (sepa-
rating economic and cultural capital) is connected to the classical left–right debate 
(Flemmen 2014; Flemmen and Haakestad 2018). Turning to the UK, Flemmen and 
Savage (2017) found that a particular aspect of postmaterial politics – xenophobia – is 
not connected to working-class culture but rather to an ‘imperial racism’ found in the 
upper echelons of society. In addition, Wheatly et al. (2014) identified distinct traces of 
a GAL/TAN and a left–right dimension in the Scottish political space. They did not, 
however, study how class relates to these dimensions.
Taken together, previous research finds support for the notion of a separate, postmate-
rial political dimension. However, support is also found for an ‘intensity of opinion’ 
(Flemmen and Haakestad, 2018: 552) or an ‘activity’-dimension (Harrits, 2013; Harrits 
et al., 2010). For the former, this dimension yields stronger explanatory power than the 
‘new’ politics dimension, which is to say that, in the space of political attitudes, peoples’ 
levels of political engagement outweighs the importance of their postmaterial differ-
ences. These studies come together in the overarching conclusion that class, as measured 
by access to cultural and economic capital as well as occupation, explain differences 
both in ‘old’ and ‘new’ politics.
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We contribute to this body of research by employing a Bourdieusian framework to 
study the space of political attitudes in the UK. Previous research until now has only 
either primarily focused upon Scandinavian societies (see Flemmen and Savage, 2017 
for an exception) or refrained from studying class in relation to the new political land-
scape (e.g. Hooghe et al., 2002; Wheatly et al., 2014). This article, by employing 
Bourdieu’s MCA to study ‘old’ and ‘new’ political sentiments, allows for the study of the 
contemporary dividing lines and tension in the UK space of political attitudes, and to 
understand how class connects to those struggles.
Data and method
We use MCA to study the dimensionality of contemporary political attitudes in the UK, 
conceptualised via Bourdieu (1984) as a space of attitudes, and in a second step to study 
how this space is shaped by class (education, income, occupation) and other demograph-
ical variables. MCA was Bourdieu’s way to ‘quantify Bourdieu’ since it matched his 
relational understanding of the social world (Lebaron, 2009). Akin to factor analysis, 
MCA is an exploratory statistical technique. It sets itself apart in that it uses a number of 
categorical variables as active variables to create a multidimensional space (Le Roux and 
Rouanet, 2010). In a second step, supplementary variables are given coordinates in the 
space in order to study, for instance, how access to resources connects to different value 
orientations (Bourdieu, 1984). MCA calculates distances between individuals ‘based on 
how different or similar they are in their response profiles’ (Flemmen and Haakestad, 
2018: 405), which results in a ‘cloud of individuals’ and a ‘cloud of categories’. As 
argued above, this methodological rationale has recently proven fruitful in the study of 
class and politics. The advantage of an exploratory method such as the MCA is that it 
allowed us to construct a space of political attitudes and thus test if the ‘new politics’ 
dimension is, as some would hold (e.g. Hooghe et al., 2002; Surridge, 2018), an alto-
gether separate dimension of political attitudes next to the traditional left–right dimen-
sion. In a second instance, we studied the coordinates of various class positions (as 
supplementary variables) in the space of political attitudes.
We used Round 8 of the ESS – a publicly available dataset comprising 1959 UK 
respondents selected with random probability sampling of people above 15 years of age 
(ESS, 2016). The UK segment of the survey was collected using face-to-face interviews 
in the period of 1 September 2016 to 20 March 2017. The response rate was 43%, which 
is lower compared with other participating countries. Data collection pursued in the 
wake of the 23 June 2016 referendum on the European Union membership foreground-
ing ‘Brexit’ – a particularly fertile ground for the study of the tensions between ‘old’ and 
‘new’ politics.
We ran a, MCA on eight variables that capture citizens’ positions on the traditional left–
right continuum as well as a ‘new politics’ continuum (see Appendix for details). In our 
ambition to capture the ‘new politics’, we adhere to the GAL/TAN-dimension (see, for 
example, Hooghe et al., 2002) since it is wider and more encompassing when compared 
with the authoritarian-libertarian dimension and more specific and less vague than the 
notion of postmaterial values. In choosing the variables for the construction of the space of 
political attitudes, we have tried to stay as close as possible to previous Bourdieusian 
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attempts to capture both ‘old’ and ‘new’ politics (Flemmen and Haakestad, 2018; Harrits, 
2013; Harrits et al., 2010). A key difference is that we have, with the exception of the sub-
jective left–right scale, focused upon respondents’ attitudes on policy-oriented statements 
and not, for instance, on political behaviours and practices.
The variables in the left column in Table 1 capture a respondent’s stance in the classi-
cal debate on ‘capitalism versus socialism’ (Evans and Tilley, 2017: 68), both in terms of 
a ‘general’ and an ‘economic’ left–right scale (Bakker et al., 2015). Here, people can be 
against or in favour of policy statements on issues such as a basic income scheme, the 
social benefits for parents to combine work and family life, and the idea that the govern-
ment should reduce income inequality. In addition to the policy statements, we used 
respondents’ self-placement on the left–right scale. The variables in the right column 
capture the ‘new politics’. That is, if people are environmentalist, cosmopolitan, and 
tolerant towards migration of people from different ethnic backgrounds coming into the 
country, if they support the right for homosexual couples to adopt children, if they are in 
favour of publicly funded efforts to reduce climate change, and are in favour of further 
European unification. Conversely, when a respondent is disagreeing to the same policy 
statements, these variables capture the extent to which people are traditional, authoritar-
ian, and nationalist in outlook (cf. Bakker et al., 2015).
In order to study if class – cultural capital, economic capital, and occupation – shapes 
how people orient themselves in the space of political attitudes, we use three supplemen-
tary variables. Level of education captures a respondent’s institutionalised cultural capi-
tal (Bourdieu, 1986). This variable was divided into six categories that include no formal 
education, apprenticeship-oriented schooling, vocational education, nursing/teachers 
training/university preparatory courses, 3–5 years of study at a university, and Master’s/
PhD degree. Economic capital was measured by household income in deciles. These 
were recoded into five categories, meaning that the lowest level of income consists of the 
1st and 2nd deciles and the highest includes the 9th and 10th deciles. In measuring occu-
pational class, we followed the Erikson and Goldthorpe scheme (1992). The occupation 
variable in the ESS does not disclose small business owners/proprietors and thus we 
were limited in that we were only allowed to study seven out of the nine defined occupa-
tional classes: higher grade professionals, lower grade professionals, higher grade rou-
tine non-manual employees, lower grade routine non-manual employees, technicians, 
Table 1. GAL/TAN and left/right wing variables (active variables).
Left/right GAL/TAN
Self-placement on left-right scale. Homosexual couples should have the right 
to adopt children.
Government should reduce differences 
in income levels.
European Union: European unification go 
further or has gone too far.
Benefits for parents to combine work 
and family even if it means higher taxes.
Allow many/few immigrants of different race/
ethnic group from majority into the country.
Against or in favour of a basic income 
scheme.
Increase taxes on fossil fuels to reduce 
climate change.
GAL/TAN: green, alternative, libertarian/traditional, authoritarian and nationalist.
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skilled manual workers, and semi/un-skilled manual workers (including farmers and 
fishermen since they account for less and 1.5% of the sample).
We use age, gender, area of residency (an urban–rural continuum), religious denomi-
nation, and level of political interest as additional supplementary points in the space of 
political attitudes. We have followed the principle that no single variable category should 
hold less than 5% of the observations, so as to avoid skewing the results (Le Roux and 
Rouanet, 2010). For this reason, the age variable was recoded into four groups (15–29; 
30–49; 50–64; 65+). Gender and religious denomination are binary variables: male/
female; belongs/does not belong to religious denomination. ‘Political interest’ was 
divided into four categories ranging from ‘not interested at all’ to ‘very interested’. 
Finally, ‘area of residency’ includes five categories ranging from ‘big city’ to ‘farm or 
house in the countryside’.
Admittedly, we are limited by relying on secondary data. While the ESS comprises a 
wide range of variables on political attitudes, it is less developed in terms of its capacity 
to measure peoples’ access to capital in the Bourdieusian sense of the term (Bourdieu, 
1986). We had to rely on educational level as the sole indicator of possession of cultural 
capital, and household income for economic capital (for a discussion, see Rosenlund, 
2015). This prevented us from constructing a space of social positions since that would 
demand more measurements of both economic and cultural capital (ibid). In this design, 
which mimics the rationale for creating a ‘symbolic space’ (ibid), class variables were 
used as supplementary points to get a view on how class may play out in the space of 
political attitudes.
Results I – the space of political attitudes in the UK
Two things stand out in the analysis of the structure of the space of political attitudes in 
the UK. First, in contrast to previous research on Scandinavia (Flemmen, 2014; Flemmen 
and Haakestad, 2018; Harrits, 2013; Harrits et al., 2010), the attitudes connected to the 
‘new politics’ do not constitute a dimension in its own right. In the horizontal axis, which 
explains 54% of the variation among the variables, ‘new politics’ and left–right opinions 
collapse into one another, which is to suggest that people in the east of the map hold both 
leftist and GAL views and those in the west hold right wing and TAN views simultane-
ously (Figure 1). Put in a different way, people located in the east of the map are left-
oriented cosmopolitans – they are open to immigration, homosexual couples’ right to 
adoption, increased taxation on fossil fuels, and they support further European unifica-
tion while at the same time endorsing social welfare policy. Those in the west, in con-
trast, are sceptical about European integration, and they believe in individual responsibility 
over social welfare and they are harbingers of traditional values.
While it is true that Hooghe et al. (2002) studied party politics rather than the attitudes 
of citizens, they do argue for an altogether new GAL/TAN line of political division. In 
contrast, Evans and Tilley (2017) contend that issues regarding EU integration and 
immigration should be understood as included in the left–right divide since they ‘involve 
economic costs and benefits that affect different types of people’ (p. 70). Similarly, 
Gidron and Hall (2017) found that right-wing vote corresponded with TAN-oriented 
dispositions. Our results go in line with this latter notion – EU unification, ‘far left’ views 
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(self-placement), and tolerance towards immigration form a cluster in the political space. 
The same goes for far right-wing views, scepticism towards immigration and homosex-
ual couples’ rights to adopt, and EU scepticism, which form constellations in the north-
western part of the map.
Our second main finding regarding the structure of the space concerns the intensity of 
the opinions that can be held regarding the policy statements under scrutiny (and the self-
placement on the left-right scale). This finding resonates with previous research that, 
however, have chosen not to focus explicitly on this fact (Flemmen and Haakestad, 2018; 
Harrits, 2013; Harrits et al., 2010). Most people, when asked, are moderate in opinion. 
The vertical axis, which explains 20% of the variation among the active variables, dif-
ferentiates between the highly opinionated and the less opinionated. People with, 
Figure 1. The space of political attitudes in the UK 2016-2017. MCA, axes 1 and 2.
Comment: Missing values have been removed (n = 1332). ++ = agree strongly/in favour of, + = agree, 
−/+ = neither/nor, − = disagree, − − = strongly disagree/not in favour of.
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relatively speaking, ‘extreme’ views, for example, ‘strongly disagreeing’ on a statement 
suggesting that homosexual couples should have the right to adopt children, or ‘strongly 
agreeing’ in that taxes should be raised to combat climate change are both located in the 
north of the space. People less animated in their opinions are located in the south of the 
map. This is where the biggest portion of the sample is located, which again suggests that 
most people are quite moderate in their stances regarding policy statements (Figure 2).
We learn thus that the ‘new politics’ conflates with the old left–right disputes, per-
haps because people tend not to hold extreme opinions. And, contrary to popular belief, 
polarisation – at least as far as the UK is concerned – is mainly taking place within a 
highly opinionated minority of the population.
A last point in regard to the construction of the space of political attitudes should be 
brought to the fore. As is evident in Figure 2, the structure of the space retains the 
Figure 2. Cloud of individuals. MCA, axes 1 and 2. Comment: Missing values have been 
removed (n = 1332).
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so-called horseshoe effect (Hjellbrekke, 2019). This oftentimes lead researchers to 
recode the data for it to better accommodate the preconceived model. Alternatively, 
researchers shift focus to another axis. While the third axis in our space explains 14% of 
the variation in the space it presents itself as variant of the first axis, where GAL/left 
orientations oppose a TAN/right pole. We have therefore not extended our analysis with 
a focus upon the third axis. We have chosen not to reconstruct the space in order to end 
up with a ‘better’, albeit more artificial, distribution in the cloud of individuals that per-
haps would have resonated with the notion that the ‘new politics’ would constitute its 
own dimension in the contemporary political landscape. In the words of Marx and Engels 
(1974), we attempt here to transcend from ‘earth to heaven’, and not the other way 
around. Indeed, the founder of correspondence analysis argued that ‘the model must fit 
the data, and not the reverse’ (Benzécri in Hjellbrekke, 2019: 1). Staying with the origi-
nal distribution arguably gives a fairer view of the actual conditions of the space of politi-
cal attitudes in the UK, and this view suggests that old and new politics conflate in the 
UK space of political attitudes, and that the space divides in terms of peoples’ intensity 
of opinion.1 Another way to put this is to say that the old and new politics, which in cer-
tain statistical analyses form different attitudinal constellations, seem to collapse into 
one another when we ‘control’ for peoples’ intensity of opinion. Again, readers should 
bear in mind that the secondary data used implies some limitations regarding the varia-
bles available. We thus call for future studies to take the discussion on the dimensionality 
of the space further.
Results II – political attitudes, class, and demographics
Figure 3 retains the structure of the space explored above. The space of political attitudes 
is formed by the extent to which people hold strong or modest opinions (north–south) 
and if their opinions consist of TAN/right values or GAL/left values (west–east). The 
active variables are now invisible and we shift focus to how class, in terms of institution-
alised cultural capital (educational level), economic capital (household income), and 
occupational class, relates to different constellations of political attitudes. Technically 
speaking, we now turn to the study of the coordinates of our first set of supplementary 
variables.
The level of educational capital matters for how people manoeuvre in the political 
landscape. People holding university degrees tend to be located in the east of the map, in 
the GAL/left domain, whereas those with no formal educational qualifications are found 
to the west where TAN/right attitudes prevail. This is supported by previous research that 
has shown that ‘high education groups are generally libertarian in outlook, while low 
education groups are authoritarian’ (Evans and Tilley, 2017; see also Stubager, 2009: 
206). People with vocationally oriented merits are the least opinionated.
People with the lowest household incomes are found in the north-western block of the 
map and are slightly in favour of a TAN/right orientation and more opinionated than the 
other income groups. Those with the highest incomes tend to lean slightly more to the 
GAL/left pole. In this space, economic capital is less of a factor compared with educa-
tional capital. Economic capital may be more clearly connected to the left–right dimen-
sion on its own (Enelo, 2012; Flemmen and Haakestad, 2018).
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With the exception of the skilled manual labourers, people in lower occupational 
classes tend to be less opinionated than people in higher occupations. Professionals 
(higher and lower) and skilled manual workers are located in the northern part of the 
map, whereas routine non-manual workers (higher, lower), semi/un-skilled manual 
workers, and technicians are found in the south. Lower grade professionals are the ones 
most likely to hold clear-cut GAL/left views, whereas higher grade professionals and 
skilled manual workers are the most likely to hold TAN/right views.
The class-related variables are found between 0 and 0.25 points from the barycentre, 
suggesting that political attitudes are only marginally formed by class (cf. Le Roux et al., 
2008). The pattern of the distribution of these variables suggests that class does, albeit to 
a limited extent, predict how people orient in the space of political attitudes. Relatively 
high volumes of capital (both economic and cultural) and occupational class (lower 
Figure 3. Class in the space of political attitudes (supplementary variables). MCA, axes 1 and 2.
Comment: Missing values have been removed (n = 1259).
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grade professionals) are connected to the GAL/left pole. The TAN/right pole is occupied 
by the highest occupational class (higher grade professionals) but also by people with the 
lowest household incomes and people with the lowest educational qualifications (cf. 
Hobolt, 2016). This may be understood in light of Bourdieu’s (1984) argument that both 
form (disengaged/engaged) and contents (taste/distaste for the necessary) of (political) 
opinions and tastes connect to class, especially cultural capital.
In Figure 4, we turn to our second set of supplementary variables. Gender is distrib-
uted along the vertical dimension – men are more opinionated than women, and tend to 
be slightly more TAN/right-oriented compared with women. The age groups cut across 
the space diagonally. The oldest group (65+) is found in the north-west and the youngest 
group (15–29–year-olds) is located in the south-east. As for area of residency, more than 
others urban dwellers are politically opinionated and tend to hold GAL/left views. People 
Figure 4. Age, gender, domicile, religious denomination, and political interest in the space of 
political attitudes (supplementary variables). MCA, axes 1 and 2.
Comment: Missing values have been removed (n = 1515). Y.o = years old.
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on the countryside, in contrast, are less opinionated and more likely to balance between 
left–right and GAL/TAN (‘farm or house in the countryside’), whereas people living in 
country villages tend to lean towards the TAN/right pole.
It is no surprise that highly opinionated people (north) are also the most politically 
interested. It is interesting to note, however, that being ‘very interested’ in politics also 
corresponds with a clear GAL/left view. People finding politics uninteresting (which 
perhaps should be viewed as an extension of an anti-establishment disposition) hold less 
animated opinions and they tend to lean towards the TAN/right pole.
Belonging to a religious denomination is connected to the horizontal axis. Those who 
belong to a religious denomination tend to be more right wing and more traditional, 
authoritarian, and nationalist in outlook. People outside of these denominations are more 
likely to be left-leaning individuals who hold green, alternative, and libertarian views.
In sum, among those holding GAL/left views tend to be young people, highly edu-
cated, not-belonging to a religious denomination, and tend to live in an urban area. As for 
people holding TAN/right views, both manual work and higher grade professionals are 
more frequently represented, as well as people of old age with low educational levels and 
residencies outside the big cities.
Discussion and conclusion
We have studied the space of political attitudes in the UK in the aftermath of the ‘Brexit’ 
referendum in the UK. Numerous commentators and researchers have identified ‘the 
postmaterial’ as a supplementing political force next to the old disputes over the redistri-
bution of resources – that is, the traditional left–right divide that dominated the political 
landscape throughout the 20th century (Habermas, 1981; Hooghe et al., 2002 Flemmen 
and Haakestad, 2018; Surridge, 2018). In studying how people in the UK relate to a 
range of policy statements capturing both ‘old’ and ‘new’ politics, we find, contrary to a 
prevailing discourse – but in line with Evans and Tilley (2017) – that key position-tak-
ings on homosexuality, migration, climate change, and the EU are intimately connected 
to left- and right-wing orientations. Regardless of the official positions assumed by the 
corresponding political parties, we have observed that citizens who lean to the left are 
more likely to endorse further EU unification, minority rights, generous migration pol-
icy, and taxation to reduce climate change. Conversely, right-wing attitudes merge with 
EU and migration scepticism, traditional values, and a reluctance to increase taxation to 
battle climate change. In the UK thus, postmaterial standpoints seem embedded in the 
old political disputes.
Our study suggests, furthermore, that polarisation occurs between a small but rela-
tively resourceful minority of the population that assumes either a strong GAL/left-wing 
orientation with higher scholastic capital or an equally strong TAN/right-wing orienta-
tion among higher professionals. It is interesting to note that this latter group is also 
populated by certain segments of the working class (skilled manual labourers). Today, 
these groups – the educational and urban elite versus well-paid higher professionals 
together with certain segments of the working class – battle out their differences on 
social media such as Twitter. Despite its few access restrictions Twitter constitutes a 
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pronounced elite platform (Blank, 2017; Dagoula, 2019; Larsson and Moe, 2012) that 
may, however, lead commentators to believe that the space of political attitudes is more 
divided than it actually is.
Another grand question regards the role played by class in today’s political landscape. 
In line with previous research (e.g. Evans and Tilley, 2017; Flemmen, 2014; Flemmen 
and Haakestad, 2018; Harrits, 2013; Stubager, 2008, 2009), we find support for the 
notion that class forms political attitudes, but only to a low extent. In fact, the political 
oppositions between the politically interested–uninterested, old–young, men–women, 
and rural–urban are for the most part more clearly demarcated than oppositions between 
people of different class positions. On an overarching level, however, the (weak) ‘class-
effect’ aligns with Bourdieu’s (1984) argument that class shapes both the ability to ‘pro-
duce an opinion’ and the contents of that opinion (the taste/distaste for the ‘necessary’). 
We observe, first, that people with a high volume of capital (both economic and cultural 
capital) and with higher occupational status are generally more opinionated than the less 
well-off segments. Additionally, GAL/left-wing orientations are more common amongst 
highly educated professionals. The outstanding traits of people holding TAN/right atti-
tudes are a lack of cultural capital and who often work in manual labour occupations. The 
by now rather well-established observation that leftist attitudes do not correspond to 
working class positions – much because of the middle-class turn taken by the Labour 
Party during the 1990s, and that the working class now ‘lacks political representation’ 
(Evans and Tilley, 2017: 2) – is supported here (see also Kitschelt, 1994). We have not, 
however, been able to discern a clear-cut effect of capital composition – educational 
merits and income levels do not display an inverted pattern in the British space of politi-
cal attitudes (TAN/right-wing attitudes are found among people with a generally low 
volume of capital). This finding stands in contrast to previous research in Scandinavia 
(Flemmen, 2014; Flemmen and Haakestad, 2018; Harrits, 2013) but it goes in line with 
a preceding failure to identify lifestyle divisions along a capital composition dimension 
in the UK (Le Roux et al., 2008) and recent updates within Bourdieusian sociology 
(Glevarec and Cibois, 2020). This, along with the relatively weak associations between 
class and political attitudes suggests, to our surprise, that the UK political landscape 
seems overall less ‘classed’ than in Scandinavia, where much of the previous Bourdieusian 
research on the topic has been carried out.
As far as the UK citizenry is concerned, the ‘old’ political dividing line between the 
left and the right remains the prevailing one, and postmaterial values are mobilised 
within the traditional political oppositions. Class continues to be a factor that contributes 
to these lines of division, albeit not as strongly as in other contexts. Given that our results 
depart from a prevailing discourse on polarisation on two distinct, old and new, political 
dimensions one may ask whether researchers have been too keen on the distinction 
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ in the realm on politics, and to overestimate the extent of politi-
cal polarisation. While it may be fruitful to theorise the material and the postmaterial, the 
‘old’ and the ‘new’, as two distinct frontiers of political dispute, one should remain sensi-
tive to the fact that they may be highly interrelated in people’s political dispositions. 
Indeed, our results suggest that these attitudinal constellations seem to collapse into one 
another when we consider people’s intensity of political opinion.
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Given that we present here a snapshot of the UK space of political attitudes, we call 
for further research on both the make-up of the space of political attitudes itself and its 
connection with class. We particularly call for studies that construct a space of social 
positions and study the potential homologies in relation to the space of political attitudes 
(Rosenlund, 2015). Such studies should also take other/more variables into account, and 
further explore the dimensionality of the UK space of political positions. Evans and 
Tilley (2017) argue that opinions of postmaterial nature collapse into the left–right 
dimension precisely because the effect of, for instance, further European integration is 
believed to be of a material nature (e.g. that immigration or EU membership/expansion 
is costly or threatening one’s job). As such it would be useful to include cosmopolitan 
orientations and other attitudinal constellations that may be more clearly postmaterial 
than the policy statements studied here. Also, we call upon researchers to design research 
instruments allowing the use of more fine-tuned instruments for constructing the space 
of political attitudes, not least by combining self-reports with digital data from the plat-
forms where the disputes play out. Finally, qualitative studies should be able to unravel 
the dynamics behind the overarching patterns identified in this study.
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Note
1. We did, however, test whether the solution with an ‘intensity’ dimension was the product of 
including too many modalities that allow for respondents to be ‘engaged’/‘disengaged’. To 
do so, we ran the MCA on a recoded set of variables where the width of the active variables 
had been reduced (generally from five to three categories). While this reduced the horseshoe 
effect to some extent the solution still retained the two dimensions described above.
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Appendix 1
Table AI. Variables to construct the space of political attitudes in the UK.
Heading Variable Category N %
GAL/TAN Homosexual couples’ right to 
adopt children
Agree strongly 508 26
 Agree 653 33
 Neither/nor 332 17
 Disagree 312 16
 Disagree strongly 131 7
 European Union: European 
unification go further or gone 
too far (1–-5)
1 ‘Unification already gone 
too far’
312 16
 2 384 20
 3 658 34
 4 278 14
 5 ‘Unification can go further’ 184 9
 Allow many/few immigrants of 
different race/ethnic group from 
majority
Many 266 14
 Some 992 51
 Few 509 26
 None 149 8
 Favour increased taxes on fossil 
fuels to reduce climate change
Agree strongly 131 7
 Agree 531 27
 Neither/nor 497 25
 Disagree 490 25
 Disagree strongly 282 14
Left–right Placement on left–right scale Far to the left 171 9
 Somewhat to the left 373 19
 Centre 721 37
 Somewhat to the right 346 18
 Far to the right 159 8
 Government should reduce 
differences in income levels
Strongly agree 376 19
 Agree 873 45
 Neither/nor 413 21
 Disagree/Strongly disagree 279 14
 Benefits for parents to combine 
work and family even if it means 
higher taxes
Strongly in favour 132 7
 In favour 997 51
 Against 662 34
 Strongly against 90 5
(Continued)
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Heading Variable Category N %
 Against or in favour of a basic 
income scheme
Strongly in favour 106 5
 In favour 819 42
 Against 699 36
 Strongly against 215 11
GAL/TAN: Green, Alternative, Libertarian versus Traditional, Authoritarian and Nationalist.
Table AII. Benzécri-adjusted eigenvalues of top 10 dimensions among the active variables.
Dimension Adjusted 
eigenvalue (%)
Cumulative %
1 53.5 53.5
2 19.5 73.0
3 14.0 87.0
4 5.0 92.0
5 2.3 94.3
6 1.5 95.8
7 1.0 96.8
8 0.8 97.6
9 0.6 98.2
10 0.5 98.7
Table AIII. Eta-squared contributions of active variables to axis 1.
Active variable Contribution 
to axis
Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic groups from 
majority into the country.
0.35
Self-placement on left–right scale. 0.35
European Union: European unification go further or has gone too far. 0.34
Homosexual couples should have the right to adopt children. 0.27
Increase taxes on fossil fuels to reduce climate change. 0.27
Benefits for parents to combine work and family even if it means 
higher taxes.
0.22
Against or in favour of a basic income scheme. 0.21
Government should reduce differences in income levels. 0.20
Table AI. (Continued)
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Table AIV. Eta-squared contributions of active variables to axis 2.
Active variable Contribution 
to axis
European Union: European unification go further or has gone too far. 0.37
Increase taxes on fossil fuels to reduce climate change. 0.28
Self-placement on left–right scale. 0.26
Against or in favour of a basic income scheme. 0.18
Government should reduce differences in income levels. 0.18
Homosexual couples should have the right to adopt children. 0.15
Benefits for parents to combine work and family even if it means higher taxes. 0.14
Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic groups from majority into 
the country.
0.11
